GRIFFIN.V24 (DO NOT DELETE)

4/16/2012 6:27 PM

THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND
DIVIDEND AND MEMBERSHIP IN
THE STATE’S POLITICAL
COMMUNITY
CHRISTOPHER L. GRIFFIN, JR.*
ABSTRACT
Despite decades of unmitigated administrative success, the Alaska Permanent
Fund Dividend (PFD) is not immune from political and legal controversy.
The symbolic and financial importance that Alaskans ascribe to their annual
dividend checks has generated disputes between ordinary residents and
executive agencies over eligibility. Litigation concerning three dominant
status requirements—minimum residency, U.S. citizenship, and felony
incarceration—reveal not only the extent to which Alaskans will pursue what
they believe to be valid claims on their share of natural resource wealth, but
also the limits of full political membership in the state. This Comment frames
a sample of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decisions on PFD eligibility in terms
of membership in Alaska’s political community. The PFD reflects the Alaska
Legislature’s opinion about valid beneficiaries from oil revenues, and the state
courts police eligibility at the margin. This Comment therefore argues that the
Alaska Supreme Court implicitly determines, on the basis of statutory intent
and administrative rule interpretations, “insiders” and “outsiders” within
the state’s political community.

INTRODUCTION
Alaskans are separated from their fellow Americans not only by an
expanse of British Columbia but also by their enlistment in one of the
most generous social welfare programs in the country. Since its
inception, Alaskans have received on average $1,100 per year between
1982 and 2010 from the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD).1 Our
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understanding of the PFD’s long-term economic consequences remains
spare, but reliable anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the state’s
residents are well aware of their annual benefits.2 Alaskans await their
dividend payments before making important household purchases, and
businesses engage in observable price competition for a larger share of
consumer spending with dividend funds.3
But the PFD’s import is not limited to the extra dollars and cents
that accrue to qualified Alaskans each year. A fairly robust conversation
conducted by political philosophers and economists about the future of
liberal-progressive economic programs surrounds the PFD.4 Indeed,
political economists analyzing asset-based welfare systems5 have long
shown interest in the PFD, especially as a blueprint for similar initiatives
in other parts of the world.6 Because the program’s administration is
relatively straightforward and uncontroversial, however, legal
scholarship includes relatively little discussion of the PFD.7 This
underrepresentation among legal academics and practitioners is both
lamentable and ripe for correction given recent debates about the
privileges of state residency and national citizenship.8

http://www.pfd.state.ak.us/appsandpaymnts/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
2. See DAVE ROSE, SAVING FOR THE FUTURE: MY LIFE AND THE ALASKA
PERMANENT FUND 157 (Kent Sturgis 2008) (“Some recipients blow the windfall on
vacations or expensive toys. Others save it for education. Many pay off medical
bills or otherwise reduce their debt. . . . In rural Alaska, however, the dividend
can make a major difference, providing an essential shot of cash to keep
subsistence hunters stocked with ammo and spare parts.”).
3. SCOTT GOLDSMITH, THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND DIVIDEND: A CASE
STUDY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF A BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE 9–10 (July 2, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/
Publications/bien_xiii_ak_pfd_lessons.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Jonathan Anderson, The Alaska Permanent Fund: Politics and
Trust, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2002, at 57; J. Patrick O’Brien & Dennis O.
Olson, The Alaska Permanent Fund and Dividend Distribution Program, 18 PUB. FIN.
Q. 139 (1990).
5. For a discussion on asset-based welfare programs in the United
Kingdom, where the phrase originated, see Will Paxton, Progressive Asset-Based
Welfare, in EQUAL SHARES?: BUILDING A PROGRESSIVE AND COHERENT ASSET-BASED
WELFARE POLICY (Will Paxton ed., 2003).
6. See, e.g., EXPORTING THE ALASKA MODEL: ADAPTING THE PERMANENT FUND
DIVIDEND FOR REFORM AROUND THE WORLD (Karl Widerquist & Michael Howard
eds., forthcoming 2012).
7. But see Laurence A. Smith, Note, A Proposed Solution to the Federal
Taxation of Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Payments, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 97 (1994)
(arguing for a repurposing of dividend payments as rebates for personal fuel
outlays to avoid federal income taxation).
8. Texas Governor Rick Perry, for example, withstood significant criticism
during the 2011 Republican presidential debates for suggesting that the children
of illegal immigrants should be allowed to attend state universities at the lower
in-state tuition rate. See Ross Ramsey, On Immigrant Tuition, Texans See It Perry’s
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This Comment connects the PFD’s economic salience to broader
points about the relationship between law and membership in a political
community. On its face, the PFD’s enacting legislation simply confers
monetary benefits on a well-defined portion of Alaska’s population.
Dividend payments carry no strings; they are disbursed on a meansindependent basis, and the state takes no stance on how residents spend
the money. Thus, the program is almost completely universal in
coverage and neutral with respect to use. Probing a bit more deeply,
though, we should understand the PFD both as the United States’ most
significant experiment with a universal asset policy and as a signifier of
full participation in the state polity. Evidence for the latter appears in
several judicial decisions demarcating the often-shifting boundary
between eligible and non-eligible recipients. Resolving these disputes
may have a negligible effect on overall PFD outlays, but the answers
provided partially suggest who “counts” as full members of the state’s
political community. To that extent, what might appear as marginal
choices about membership in this community might actually say a great
deal about its fundamental norms and values.
This Comment is organized as follows. Part I briefly explains the
PFD’s history, structure, and performance. Part II reviews state court
decisions on three barriers to receiving dividend payments: the
minimum residency requirement, American citizenship, and felony
incarceration. In all three cases, the Alaska Supreme Court has declined
to recognize constitutional and statutory violations for failure to receive
dividend payments when the plaintiff does not meet the status
requirement. Part III considers the extent to which these judicial
opinions reveal a broader understanding of who the state considers full
participants in the political community. On this reading, receipt of
dividends does not necessarily signify an individual’s direct
participation in political decision-making. Rather, this Comment argues
that it entrenches a notion that political citizenship “runs with the land.”
Only those who legally call Alaska territory home for a sufficient period
of time will reap the abundant benefits from the ground beneath their
feet.

Way, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at A23.
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PFD
The PFD sprung to life in 1980 through legislation spearheaded by
Governor Jay Hammond. An institution known as the Alaska
Permanent Fund (APF) was created in the preceding decade, but the
APF had no overarching purpose.9 It was partially a state-run
investment vehicle and partially a source of capital funds for large-scale
development projects.10 Hammond’s intervention was indispensable for
reorienting the Fund toward its current trajectory. A protracted debate
between those who one insider called “loan crazies”—stakeholders
pushing for applying APF monies toward significant capital
development—and the arguably more prudent preferences of Governor
Hammond played out in the last three years of the 1970s and effectively
ended with the 1980 legislative session.11
Governor Hammond’s personal philosophy regarding the proper
use of the state’s bounty ultimately carried the day. As a self-described
political outsider, Hammond remained skeptical of concentrating wealth
in the government’s hands.12 Believing that “the money could be used
better by individuals than spent on government programs or invested in
development projects,” the bill he shepherded set the first dividend
payment at fifty dollars and conferred on each adult one dividend per
year of residency since 1959.13 The final codified version, which controls
dividend payments to the present day, stipulates that: 1) potential
recipients apply to the Department of Revenue; 2) be state residents on
the date of application and during the qualifying year; 3) be physically
present in the state for at least seventy-two consecutive hours during the
two years preceding the current dividend year; and 4) meet certain
qualifications pertaining to immigration status.14 The statute also spells
out further restrictions on the residency requirement.15 The amount of
the dividend each year depends on a complex statutory formula but one
that has led to reasonably predictable annual payments.16
The Alaska Constitution explicitly commands the prudent use of

9. See ROSE, supra note 2, at 185.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 151.
12. Id. at 158.
13. Id. at 158–59.
14. ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(a) (2010).
15. Id. § 43.23.008 (setting out the conditions under which yearly absences
may not exceed 180, 120, or 45 days depending on the nature of those absences).
16. Id. § 43.23.025. Although the dividend amount depends on the formula
in this section, the outcome invariably will fluctuate since the formula inputs
include the number of eligible residents and accounting for underpayments that
accrued in previous years. See id.
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the state’s natural resources for the general welfare of its residents.17
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Alaska Constitution requires the legislature
to utilize, develop, and conserve the state’s natural resources “for the
maximum benefit of its people.”18 Moreover, the 1976 amendments to
the Alaska Constitution formally enshrined the new APF.19 By nearly all
accounts, the PFD has been a success and followed through on the
constitutional promise to use Alaska’s natural resources for the greater
good:
[In 2011,] [t]he Permanent Fund had an outstanding fiscal year,
returning just over 20 percent and ending slightly above $40
billion. This is the first time the Fund’s year-end value has
closed at over $40 billion and only the third time the returns
have broken the 20 percent threshold. . . .
....
. . . Since the Fund was created 35 years ago by Alaska
voters, it has paid out $19.2 billion in dividends, more than the
$15.6 billion in mineral revenues and other deposits it has taken
in, and was still worth $40.1 billion on June 30.
Another way to measure success is the recognition that the
Permanent Fund has received from its peers and outside
groups. A few years ago, the Peterson Institute ranked the
Alaska Permanent Fund as the most transparent of all of the
sovereign wealth funds . . . . When the International Monetary
Fund led the discussion with other sovereign wealth funds to
draft the Santiago Principles for transparent governance, much
of the document was based on the Alaska Permanent Fund
Corporation’s current practices.20
Much of this success has been tied to the creation of the Permanent
Fund Corporation (PFC), also launched in 1980,21 which has contributed
significant additional transfers to the Fund. The PFC serves as the

17. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
18. Id.
19. Id. art. IX, § 15 (“At least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease rentals,
royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal mineral revenue sharing payments and
bonuses received by the State shall be placed in a permanent fund, the principal
of which shall be used only for those income-producing investments specifically
designated by law as eligible for permanent fund investments. All income from
the permanent fund shall be deposited in the general fund unless otherwise
provided by law.”).
20. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., YESTERDAY, TODAY & TOMORROW: 2011
ANNUAL
REPORT
3
(2011),
available
at
http://www.apfc.org/
_amiReportsArchive/APFC%20Annual%20Report%202011.pdf;
see
also
Anderson, supra note 4, at 60–63 (documenting the evolution of the PFD).
21. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., supra note 20, at 25.
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investment strategist for the Fund and may only invest revenues in
income-producing vehicles according to the prudent investor rule.22 The
most significant tension exists, then, not with the structure or
management of the APF but with the divide between residents’
interpretations about valid claims under the PFD statute and those of
the centralized administration under the Department of Revenue. These
disputes have been resolved, usually in favor of the state government,
through a series of court rulings dating back to the 1990s. It is those
cases that this Comment argues help shape the contours of state
citizenship.

II. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS OF PFD ELIGIBILITY
Although most of the disputes finding their way onto the state
court docket concern the minimum residency requirement, the specific
legal issues within that category span a variety of circumstances.23
Moreover, before the Alaska Legislature formally amended the PFD
statute to exclude illegal aliens and certain incarcerated prisoners,
complaints often surfaced to challenge denial of dividend payments on
these grounds. The following sections review noteworthy court rulings
about eligibility for clues into how the judiciary polices the boundary
between full and partial participants in the state polity.
A.

Residency Requirements

Perhaps the easier cases involve bona fide Alaska residents who fail
to satisfy the statutory minimum for days spent in the state.24 A leading
example arose in Church v. State, where the plaintiff claimed equal
protection and substantive due process violations for failure to receive

22. For an overview of the PFC’s investment guidelines, see ALASKA
PERMANENT FUND CORP., AN ALASKAN’S GUIDE TO THE PERMANENT FUND 14–23
(2009),
available
at
http://www.apfc.org/home/Media/publications/
2009AlaskansGuide.pdf. For a discussion of the prudent investor rule, see John
H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81
IOWA L. REV. 641, 645–54 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Eagle v. State, 153 P.3d 976, 977 (Alaska 2007) (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that a federal law pertaining to the civil rights of
servicepersons preempted Alaskan law); State v. Gazaway, 793 P.2d 1025, 1025
(Alaska 1990) (holding that children’s absence was not temporary under the PFD
statute and upholding denial of dividend payments).
24. See, e.g., Schikora v. State, 7 P.3d 938, 942 (Alaska 2000) (plaintiff
claiming PFD despite exceeding the statutory absence requirement in part
because he had lived in Alaska since 1945); Underwood v. State, 881 P.2d 322,
324 (Alaska 1994) (plaintiff claiming that he would not have moved from Texas
to Alaska as early as he did but for the dividend payment).
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his 1993 payment.25 Patrick Church was present in the state for only 91
days, well short of the 185-day minimum required under the PFD
statute. The reason seemed facially legitimate: to care for his ailing
mother who lived in another jurisdiction.26 Because of this exigency,
Church contended that any bright line cutoff (e.g., the 180-day
maximum absence) was unreasonable and unconstitutional.27 More
specifically, under his reading the administrative rules accompanying
the PFD statute remove necessary flexibility and discretion beyond cases
enumerated in the regulations.28
The court summarily dismissed Church’s attack using its precedent
in Brodigan v. Alaska Department of Revenue.29 The issue in Brodigan was
even closer than that in Church. The married couple whose dividend
applications had been rejected spent the fall and winter months in the
lower forty-eight states because of John Brodigan’s vascular health
issues.30 On the advice of physicians, the Brodigans believed that
avoiding the much colder Alaska climate during these seasons was in
John’s best interest.31 The Department of Revenue’s regulations
unsurprisingly included a medical exemption to the residency
requirement.32 However, the Department disagreed that seasonal
residency changes fell within the medical exemption, and the court
accepted that interpretation.33 What ultimately mattered was the
relationship between the directives of qualified physicians and the intent
to reside in Alaska.34 Thus, in Church the Alaska Supreme Court also
deferred to the Department’s judgment that Alaskans must reside in the
state for at least half the year since “the purpose of [the statutory
residency requirement] is to ensure that PFDs are only given to

25. 973 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Alaska 1999).
26. Id. At the time the Alaska Supreme Court decided Church the original
PFD statute had been amended precisely to exempt absences for medical leave.
Id. at 1127 n.1.
27. Id. at 1128.
28. Id.
29. 900 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1995).
30. Id. at 729–30.
31. Id. at 729.
32. That regulation now appears formally in the PFD statute. ALASKA STAT.
§ 43.23.008(a)(5) (2010) (“[A]n otherwise eligible individual who is absent from
the state during the qualifying year remains eligible for a current year
permanent fund dividend if the individual was absent . . . receiving continuous
medical treatment recommended by a licensed physician or convalescing as
recommended by the physician who treated the illness if the treatment or
convalescence is not based on a need for climatic change.”). This language seems
to have been inserted specifically with the Brodigans’ case in mind.
33. Brodigan, 900 P.2d at 731.
34. Id.
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permanent residents and a legitimate function of corresponding
regulations is to ease the administrative burdens of determining
eligibility.”35
As a comparison, many other laws—the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) of 199336 in particular—impose their own attachment
mandates, i.e., threshold levels of continuous connection with or service
for an entity granting statutory benefits.37 For example, simply working
for an employer with at least fifty employees at the time one seeks
FMLA benefits does not suffice. The petitioning employee must have
worked for her employer for at least 12 months prior to the leave period
and for 1,250 hours during the most recent 12 months.38 Just as with the
PFD residency requirement, employees have litigated numerous cases
challenging their status as covered individuals under the FMLA.39 In
these courtroom jousts over eligibility, one observes a unique exchange
between citizens and courts regarding legislative prerogatives and what
benefits constitute the core of citizenship.
B.

Immigration Status

In addition to direct statutory language on the requisite number of
days one must reside in the state, the Alaska Legislature authorized the
Commissioner of the Department of Revenue to promulgate
supplementary regulations about minimum U.S. citizenship
requirements. The most important case decided on immigration status
occurred before the PFD statute was amended explicitly to exclude
illegal aliens. In State v. Cosio, the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the
Commissioner’s reading of the original statute’s intention-based

35. Church v. State, 973 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Alaska 1999) (emphasis added).
36. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654 (2012)).
37. The Author has argued elsewhere that family and medical leave laws,
both state and federal, reflect judgments about the universal affirmative rights
that should accrue to all covered by the relevant legislature. Christopher L.
Griffin, Jr., Medical Leave-Taking After the FMLA: An Empirical Analysis of
Affirmative Employment Rights 13–16 (Nov. 22, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974572.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2012).
39. See, e.g., Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
plaintiff’s argument that she should be “entitled to credit for the three to five
minutes she spent each workday putting on and removing her gloves, shoes,
and work shirt” toward the necessary 1250 hours under the FMLA); Engelhardt
v. S.P. Richards Co., 472 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006) (denying FMLA coverage to an
employee claiming that her employer included two integrated companies, which
would have met the statutory minimum of fifty employees within seventy-five
miles).
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language.40 Specifically, the law at the time of Cosio merely defined
“‘state resident’ as ‘an individual who is physically present in the state
with the intent to remain indefinitely in the state.’”41 Arturo and Tomas
Cosio lived in the United States illegally but averred that “they were
physically present in Alaska and intended to remain.”42 At issue were
payments received in 1985 and 1986 and denied in 1987, the period
during which the Cosios lived in Alaska.43 The Department stood firm
against sending the final dividend and demanded the remitter of the
previous two dividends.44 Its legal basis was a regulation under which
“[a]n alien with resident alien status . . . is eligible to receive a permanent
fund dividend.”45
The Alaska Supreme Court, in another nod to the presumed
superior authority and expertise of administrative agencies, focused as it
did with the Church case on the relevancy of permanent residency.46 In
other words, it is no coincidence that the Permanent Fund Dividend has
been understood as properly accruing to individuals living continuously
and legally within the state’s borders. The PFD statute and associated
regulations undoubtedly must, as a matter of fundamental fairness,
reflect line-drawing exercises that distinguish valid residents from
others free-riding on the beneficence of the state. Whether the courts
should have deferred less to agency discretion when effectuating that
goal, for example by taking subjective intent to self-identify as an
Alaskan into account, is a question this Comment does not take up. But
the answer to it certainly underscores the importance of the likelihood
that someone will live in Alaska permanently and legally before
receiving dividend payments.
C.

Incarcerated Felons

Alaskans who have been convicted of felonies and reside in prison
are legally excluded from receiving PFD payments. In response, some
prisoners have lodged complaints that the PFD statute and agency rules
violate both the U.S. and Alaska Constitution’s Equal Protection

40. 858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993). For a case uncomplicated by statutory
amendment in the immigration context, see State v. Andrade, 23 P.3d 58 (Alaska
2001).
41. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 623 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(7) (2010)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.615(d) (1988) (repealed
1989)) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 627.
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Clauses. In the first major case to reach the Alaska Supreme Court, State
v. Anthony, the court denied that exacting levels of scrutiny applied to
the purely economic interest represented by the PFD and held that the
legislature had acted reasonably in denying PFDs to incarcerated
felons.47 At the heart of the equal protection claim was the
reasonableness of treating the incarcerated differently than persons who
may have committed similar crimes but for some stroke of luck are not
behind bars.
The Anthony court sided with the state, especially its assertion that
the purpose of excluding prisoners from PFD payments was “to
compensate the state partially for the cost of incarcerating felons.”48 In
addition to accepting the reimbursement justification for withholding
PFD payments, the court also recognized restitution as a valid purpose.49
No doubt swayed by prudential considerations, the court artfully
disentangled—and destroyed—the equal protection claim:
It is possible that a felon may have his dividend taken by the
state even though he has already paid restitution to his
victim. . . . There are, however, at least two reasons why
individual restitution orders may be inadequate: (1) a felon
who owes a victim restitution might not even apply for a
permanent fund dividend since he or she will not benefit from
it; and (2) since many felons do not have the means to pay
restitution, victims must depend on the crime victim’s
compensation fund. . . . [E]qual protection does not require
perfection. We are persuaded that those felons who are
sentenced to serve time in prison are more likely than those
who are not sentenced to incarceration to have seriously
harmed others.50
Thus, the court decided the legislature’s judgment that incarcerated
felons do not deserve PFD payments corresponded to an equally
legitimate assumption that an incarcerated felon has committed a more
blameworthy crime. By exceeding the scope of the prison maintenance
cost-saving rationale, the Anthony ruling manifests the state judiciary’s
view about the relative position of the imprisoned in the political
community. Simply stated, that position is inferior.
Other constitutional arguments that incarcerated felons have
adopted, albeit unsuccessfully, allege that denying dividend benefits
amounts to an ex post facto punishment or violation of double jeopardy
47.
48.
49.
50.

810 P.2d 155 (Alaska 1991).
Id. at 159.
Id. at 161.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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protections.51 Because the Commissioner’s decision to withhold
payment does not itself follow from a criminal statute, the Alaska
Supreme Court found one inmate’s ex post facto complaint to be
without merit.52 The same conclusion led the court to reject his double
jeopardy claim since the denial of PFD resources was not a separate
punishment from the plaintiff’s forty-year murder sentence.53
The equal protection jurisprudence is the weakest that the Alaska
Supreme Court has proffered in the PFD context to uphold the
Department of Revenue’s payment denials. In lieu of outright forfeiture,
incarcerated felons could have their dividends held in trust, just as the
oil revenue source is held in trust by the state, until their release.
Moreover, the court’s answer to the arbitrariness of withholding PFDs
from felons over misdemeanants and incarcerated felons over nonincarcerated felons does not resonate as well as it could. Although one
might criticize the 180-day residency requirement as arbitrary even
without standing in the shoes of Patrick Church and the Brodigans, the
indiscriminate felon incarceration standard rests on particularly shaky
grounds. First, even if one were to admit that the average misdemeanant
has committed a less heinous crime, there is no empirical evidence—at
least none to which the courts have pointed—to suggest that felons
outside of prison pose less risk to society than their incarcerated
counterparts. Second, the goal of compensating crime victims, which the
court in Anthony held valid, is distinct from defraying the costs of
administering state prisons. Putting aside the court’s discussion of
restitution, if the controlling rationale has become compensating victims
instead of the penal system, then withholding PFDs to the imprisoned
makes little sense. The court cannot guarantee that the withheld funds
will reach the intended beneficiary under a victims’ rights theory. At
least if the goal were to “pay into” the prison system, one could be sure
that the PFD money either remains in the state’s hands or offsets the tax
bill of the average citizen through higher PFD check amounts.

III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP
The decisions reviewed in Part II uniformly indicate that individual
challenges to the PFD’s enacting statutory text and associated
51. Such legal reasoning mirrors strategies pursued unsuccessfully by
released felons subject to sexual offender registration and notification programs.
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
52. Hertz v. Storer, 943 P.2d 725, 726 (Alaska 1997) (citing State v. Anthony,
816 P.2d 1377 (Alaska 1991)).
53. Id.
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regulations find little favor with the Alaska Supreme Court. One
account explaining this outcome could be the high level of judicial
deference to legislative and administrative bodies. Another could
involve more fundamentally the fact that claimants believe themselves
(genuinely or not) to be situated at the margins of eligibility and seek
declaratory relief that pushes them into the category of valid PFD
recipients. With enough residents believing that they qualify after a
Department of Revenue denial of payment, the odds surely increase that
some proportion of these suits will be frivolous.
These cases express something deeper about Alaska’s political
fabric. Some observers might surmise, as the Anthony court so clearly
expressed,54 that the PFD is a vestige of economic citizenship rather than
a badge of political inclusion. Yet this view loses force in any jurisdiction
that relies so deeply on natural resources for economic subsistence and,
further, where the population identifies itself with the land as Alaskans
do. Although economic rights usually are considered subsets within
larger bundles,55 the fiscal blends almost completely with the political
under the PFD system. The residency, citizenship, and incarceration
cases to varying degrees reflect the combined views of the legislature
and the bench about who “counts” as a full member of the state by tying
legal status to economic benefits. To be sure, many state and federal
transfers also depend on satisfying legal requirements (e.g., Medicaid
receipts and immigration status). But the PFD transfer symbolizes
something much more fundamental. Given the history of the program
and the political branches’ desire to preserve the state’s natural
resources for current and future generations, the individual’s stake in
the physical commons parallels her stake in the political unit.
Furthermore, the affirmative orientation of the PFD system
supports a conception of judicial and administrative eligibility
determinations as reaching the core of political membership.
“Affirmative” rights express a positive grant by the government to the
advantage of the recipient.56 A narrower definition might also require
that the beneficiary take some prescribed action before the transfer
54. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 162 (“An individual’s interest in a permanent fund
dividend, like other economic interests, is entitled to minimum scrutiny.”).
55. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM.
ECON. REV. 347 (1967); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43
UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).
56. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1066 (1977) (predicting the emergence of a doctrine “that
recognizes . . . rights to decent levels of affirmative governmental protection in
meeting the basic human needs of physical survival and security, health and
housing, employment and education”).
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accrues, as is the case for PFD recipients. Because receipt depends on an
individual affirmatively applying for the dividend, the program remains
universal—in accord with the constitutional directive—but forces
Alaskans to petition for their share of the oil revenue stream. This
characteristic signals deeper normative judgments about who should
receive the pro rata share of natural resource wealth, not just how much a
qualifying beneficiary receives. The reason is that the government asks
residents to step forward and claim their shares. Just as appearing in the
voting booth to cast a ballot symbolizes civic participation across the
country, so too does filing personal applications for the PFD in Alaska.
Since the state compels Alaskans to take affirmative action, denied
dividends potentially represent a more deeply negative judgment about
one’s place in the political order. “Outsiders” will be turned away, while
“insiders” will collect their checks. Such border policing admittedly
occurs through a very simple mechanism, the modest annual PFD sum.
As a result, one might scoff at this attempt to equate a bureaucratic
decision with one’s fundamental political identity. But when the benefit
embodies the sort of intergenerational bequest that the PFD does,
particularly when secured by the good fortune of plentiful natural
resources (rather than taxes on wealth, income, or consumption), its
availability partially defines the set of full participants in the society.

CONCLUSION
The Alaska PFD serves as a beacon for political economists seeking
to implement asset-based welfare programs in other parts of the United
States and around the world. Despite close to three decades of
unmitigated achievement, the PFD is not without controversy within the
state’s borders. Various claims to dividend shares have been rejected by
the Department of Revenue and the state’s highest court because the
claimants have not met the legal definition of qualified recipients. The
responses from Alaska residents, also of varying probative value,
present real disputes over constitutional and statutory interpretation.
Consequently, the endgame is not just the final judgment in a particular
litigation matter. The court’s discussions, grappling as they have with
deference to administrative agencies, reasonableness, and the relative
contributions (or free-riding) of potential beneficiaries, engage questions
of profound legal importance. And those legal questions blend often
seamlessly with political ones, namely who shares fully in civil society.
No evidence currently implies forthcoming amendments to the PFD
statute that would expand the eligibility provisions, and thus the
boundaries of political inclusion, beyond their current location.
However, should future innovations in APF administration arise, from
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recalculating the dividend amount to organizing larger public
investment projects, such developments will affirm whatever vision that
generation of Alaskans holds for the composition of its political
community.

